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"One Order of Genocide and Two Sides of
Extinction": Proposing an International
Solution to Preventing the Destruction of
the Elephant and Rhinoceros Species in
Mozambique and Tanzania
BY SEAN PAN*
Introduction
Just seventy years ago, Justice Jackson, prosecutor for the
Nuremburg Trials, justified the prosecution of multiple Nazi party
members for various international crimes in his opening statement.'
While it was "the first truly international prosecution of individuals,"
it stood the test of time by setting the benchmark for prospective
international cases:
The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have
been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that
civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it
cannot survive their being repeated ... Civilization asks
whether law is so laggard as to be utterly helpless to deal
with crimes of this magnitude .. . It does not expect that
you can make war impossible [but] [i]t does expect that
your judicial action will put the forces of international
law, its precepts, its prohibitions and, most of all, its
* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.S.,
University of California, Davis (2010). 1 want to thank Professors Bruce A. Wagman and
Naomi Roht-Arriaza of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, whose
expertise in their individual fields of practice provided the essential insight, guidance and
inspiration to complete this note.
1. BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 101 (3rd ed. 2015).
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sanctions, on the side of peace.... 2
The Nuremburg Court eventually indicted twenty-four Nazi
leaders; and of those, eleven were sentenced to death.3 However,
Justice Jackson's ability to influence the Court to convict the
individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes
against the peace, was not merely due to the proof of the substantive
elements of the crimes charged.4 Rather, it was a result of a policy
decision: that threats against humanity-representing conduct "so
grave or heinous"-should not be left unpunished.'
Today, genocide is the "'modem word for an old crime"' and
was created after Nuremburg to more accurately "describe what
happened to the Jews and other so-called undesirable groups at the
hands of [the] Nazis." 6 The fact a new term was coined specifically
to represent the atrocious and indiscriminate killing of specific
groups is testament to the international community's unwillingness
to leave these unforgivable acts unpunished.7
But what is it that truly makes genocide so intolerable that the
international community is willing to prosecute it in the manner and
degree that has been established? Society has clearly chosen to
forgive some acts and punish others, but those decisions are often
without explanation. For example, when the United States bombed
Hiroshima in World War II (WWII), "wip[ing] out 90 percent of the
city and immediately kill[ing] 80,000 people" along with the tens of
thousands of other victims who would later die as a result of the
radiation, the country was not charged with genocide or any other
international crime for that matter.8 However, when the Nazis
massacred the Jews in the concentration camps, they were labeled as
war criminals and held responsible for a "Nazi genocide." 9 History is
2. Id.
3. Id. at 100.
4. Id. at 101.
5. See VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 101; Beth Van Schaack, Note: The Crime of
Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention's Blind Spot, 106 Yale L.J. 2259,
2278 (1997).
6. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 5, at 2262.
7. Id.
8. Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/to
pics/world-war-ii/bombing-of-hiroshima-and-nagasaki (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
9. The Nazi Genocide, http://www.adolfhitler.dk/newpage8.htm (last visited Mar. 24,
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riddled with these inconsistencies, but due to the nature and degree
of the conduct associated with genocide, it is given a special place in
the universe of international crimes.
This Note posits the notion that the massacre of the elephant and
rhinoceros species in Mozambique and Tanzania resembles the type
of monstrous conduct the international community generally brands
as the crime of genocide. While it is folly to ignore genocide's
historical application towards human victims, both the relentless
manner in which these animals are killed along with their drastically
diminished populations begs, at least, for international criminal
charges and convictions. Additionally, modem legal precedent and
historical practices suggest a broader application of the crime of
genocide-one that should include other protected (and threatened)
groups.
To this end, I propose a new form of international prosecution
through the crime of genocide that can help combat the mass
destruction of the elephant and rhino species in Mozambique and
Tanzania. In doing so, I hope to highlight the need for increased
international legal enforcement in light of dwindling domestic and
international safeguards. While this proposal suggests fundamental
changes to our international court system, it may be the only
remaining lifeline to save these animals from a rampant ivory trade,
which is now "one of the fastest growing areas of international
crime" and only behind "the black market trade in drugs and arms."10
This Note is divided into three sections. Section I will provide a
general background behind the black market ivory trade and its
disastrous effect on the elephant and rhino populations in
Mozambique and Tanzania. Section II will explain why increased
international prosecution is necessary in light of ineffective domestic
and international legal safeguards. Finally, Section III will describe
the practicality of applying the international charge of genocide to
poachers of the black market ivory trade.
2015).
10. BEN DAVIES, BLACK MARKET 22, 27 (Adam Oswell, 2004).
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I. The Sad Reality of the Black Market Ivory Trade in
Mozambique and Tanzania
Today's illegal trade in ivory has induced a level of death and
heinous conduct that is certainly comparable to instances of
genocide. In fact, the results of such a profitable enterprise have nearly
decimated entire elephant and rhino populations in Mozambique and
Tanzania through poaching.
Studies in Mozambique, for example, revealed drastic losses of
approximately 30,400 elephants from the 1970s to present day."
Additionally, most experts agree that Mozambique's sparse
population of rhinos are now either completely extinct or near the
"brink of vanishing" from the region. 12 Tanzania's deteriorating
populations of elephants and rhinos are also a common trend. For
instance, "[b]etween 1977-87, Tanzania lost over 50,000 elephants to
poachers, [which was] more than 50 per cent of its population." 13
Then, between 2002 and 2009, the elephant population plummeted
again by 21,000.14 Rhino losses, on the other hand, were even more
alarming since they recorded a mere thirty-two rhinos left in
existence in 1995.15
11. See Environmentalists Call for Trade Sanctions Against Mozambique for Rhino and
Elephant Poaching, PR NEWSWIRE (July 02, 2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/environmentalists-call-for-trade-sanctions-against-mozambique-for-rhino-and-eleph
ant-poaching-26554381 1.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2016); See Mozambique: Elephant
Poaching "a National Disaster," ALL AFRICA (Sept. 22, 2014), http://allafrica.com/stori
es/201409222278.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
12. Michelle Faul, Rhinos in Mozambique Likely Extinct, Expert Says; Elephants May
Be Next, HUFFINGTON POST (May 2, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/02/r
hinos-mozambique-extinct_n_3200840.html. (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
13. Environmental Investigation Agency, Vanishing Point, Criminality, Corruption and
the Devastation of Tanzania's Elephants 2 (2014), http://eia-intemational.org/wp-
content/uploads/EIA-Vanishing-Point-lo-res l.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
14. See Fumbuka Ng'wanakilala, Tanzania President Says Poaching Boom Threatens
Elephant Population, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://www.reuters.co m/article/
2014/02/13/us-tanzania-poaching-idUSBREAICICK20140213 (last visited Feb.16, 2016);
see Tanzania Renews Call For International Ban On All Ivory, Rhino Horn, MELLOWSWAN
FOUNDATION AFRICA - TANZANIA (Oct. 19, 2014), http://mellowswan afri ca.org/tanzania-
renews-call-for-intemational-ban-on-all-ivery-rhino-horn/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2016); see
Elizabeth Gordon, What Can You Do About Elephant & Rhino Poaching, HUFFINGTON POST
(Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.huffingtonp ost.co m/elizabethgordon/what-you-can-do-about-
eleb6043154.html (last visited Feb.16, 2016).
15. Tanzania Renews Callfor International Ban on All Ivory, supra note 14.
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Despite the unimaginable losses in both species, heinous
poaching methods continue to permeate the black market ivory trade.
More often than not, poachers use increasingly cruel and sadistic
methods of ivory extraction due to an indifference towards animal
life. Some of these practices include hacking off ivory tusks while
the animal is alive, or shooting infant elephants as a ploy to attract
the rest of the herd. 16 Many times, this results in distressing scenes of
suffering: rhinos with their horns chain-sawed off, exposing "soft
tissue injuries .. . down into the remnants of [their] face, through the
outer layer of bones . . . [with] pieces of loose flesh . . . semi-detached
... and blood bubbling inside skull cavities."' 7 Unfortunately, these
unimaginable cruelties have become an all too common scene in the
ivory trade.
The overwhelming reason for such dramatic losses and
indifference to elephant and rhino fatalities seems to be based on the
stunning value of ivory in the illegal trade. In the black market,
elephant and rhino tusks are one of the "most expensive
commodit[ies] on Earth" and dubbed as "white gold" by poachers.' 8
Often, elephant ivory can sell for $400 per kilogram and rhino horns
fetch up to $65,000 a kilogram, making them an obvious source of
income and "a one-way ticket to prosperity" for those poachers
seeking a quick profit.19
Another integral part of this process are the ivory consumers
whose "demand from . . . around the world .. . fuels this grisly
trade." 20 Asian countries are now increasingly to blame since they
revere ivory as a "status symbol" and ensure ongoing demand. 2 1 This
16. DAVIES, supra note 10, at 20, 26; ASSOCIATED PRESS, Untouchables: Asia 's Biggest
Wildhfe Traffickers, Fox NEWS (Aug. 15 2012), http://www.foxne ws.com/scitech/2012/08/
15/untouchables-asia-biggest-wildlife-traffickers/ (last visited Feb.16, 2016); Paul Tyson,
Exposed: The Brutal World of Tanzania's Illegal Ivory Poaching Industry, ITV NEWS (Mar.
4, 2015), http://www.itv.com/news/2015-03-04/exposed-brutal-world-of-tanzanias-illegal-
ivory-poaching-industry/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
17. Revealing the Cruelty Inflicted on Rhinos, THE MERCURY (Aug 29, 2011, 2:10PM),
http://www.iol.co.za/mercury/revealing-the-cruelty-inflicted-on-rhinos-1.1127041#.VKhw
SrktDIU (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
18. See Tyson, supra note 16.
19. DAVIES, supra note 10, at 93; Gabriel Gatehouse, African Elephant Poaching
Threatens Wildlife Future, BBC NEWS (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-21018429; Gordon, supra note 14 (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
20. DAVIES, supra note 10, at 19.
21. Environmental Investigation Agency, supra note 13, at 4; DAVIES, supra note 10 at
34.
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is due to ivory's many revered functions in Eastern cultures
(purportedly to cure cancer, alleviate asthma symptoms, separate
poison from liquid, or even increase sexual libido), which makes
them extremely desirable for consumers. 22 As a result, China is now
the "largest single destination for illicit ivory," "importing as much
as fifteen tons each year, [or] the equivalent of fifteen hundred dead
elephants." 2 3 It is no surprise that this promise of wealth along with
high consumer demand has quickly propelled the illegal ivory trade
to one of the fastest growing areas of international crime, which is
estimated by Interpol to be worth at least $6 billion per year.2 4
The obvious end-result is a lucrative black market ivory trade
where "[t]he laws of supply and demand have. . .led to a vicious
circle" of elephant and rhino poaching in Mozambique and
Tanzania. 25 And while poaching is not the sole reason for this
massacre, it remains the "overwhelming cause." 26 Moreover, in a
reality where "[p]oachers are responsible for nearly 60-90 per cent of
elephant deaths in Tanzania" and are a primary factor for the
decrease in rhino populations, there is little hope in saving the
species from extinction without more drastic and innovative
measures to fight the illegal ivory trade.2 7
The next section will explain why the illegal ivory trade
continues to prosper and provide a safe haven for poachers. As such,
I will analyze the lethal combination of ineffective domestic
protections in Mozambique and Tanzania as well as the available yet
underutilized international safeguards.
22. Gordon, supra note 14; Environmental Investigation Agency, supra note 13, at 4-
5; Tanzania Renews Call For International Ban On All Ivory, Rhino Horn, supra note 14;
DAVIES, supra note 10, at 59.
23. Rosie Spinks, Illegal Ivory Openly on Sale in Chinese Cities, ECOLOGIST (Aug. 17,
2011), http://www.theecologist.org/News/newsanalysis/1019180/illegalivoryopenlyonsalei
nchinesecities.html (last visited Feb.16, 2016).
24. DAVIES, supra note 10, at 21-22.
25. Id. at 19.
26. ALAN GREEN, ANIMAL UNDERGROUND 12 (Public Affairs, 1st ed. 1999);
Environmental Investigation Agency, supra note 13, at 5.
27. Environmental Investigation Agency, supra note 13, at 5; Tanzania Renews Call
For International Ban On All Ivory, supra note 14; David Smith, Execute Elephant
Poachers on the Spot, Tanzanian Minister Urges, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2013, 11:17 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/oct/08/shoot-elephant-poachers-tanzaniaivo
ry (last visited Feb. 16, 2016); Gordon, supra note 14.
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II. What Current Domestic and International Safeguards are
In Place and Why They Continue to Fail
The existing domestic and international response to the black
market ivory trade falls short for a variety of reasons. 2 8 However, the
overwhelming cause of the destruction is ultimately a dangerous
mixture of ineffective local laws along with an international
community that is unwilling to accept a larger prosecutorial role.2 9 I
detail the current state of (A) domestic and (B) international efforts
below.
A. The Domestic Response
It is clear that Mozambique and Tanzania face a formidable task
in trying to stop the black market ivory trade; one that is certain to
expound without effective intervention. Today, limited resources,
weak penalties, and prevalent corruption at the "highest levels of
local and regional government," have made legal enforcement nearly
impossible in either country.30 In Tanzania, for example, there have
been numerous instances of government-hired "[g]ame rangers
provid[ing] critical information to poachers, [while] police officers
supply guns, Tanzanian Revenue Authority officers release
containers of ivory for export, and ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi
(CCM) party functionaries offer high-level protection for trafficking
operations."3 1 Mozambique has also revealed similar corruption
through failing to prosecute cases and releasing offenders after a
payment of bribes. 32
These instances of corruption have infiltrated the highest levels
of local government and even those directly responsible for
28. DAVIES, supra note 10, at 19; see Salaam, supra note 14; See Revealing the Cruelty
Inflicted on Rhinos, supra note 17.
29. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora Preamble.
30. DAVIES, supra note 10, at 93; Gordon, supra note 14.
31. Andreas Wilson-Spath, Home-grown Corruption is Killing Africa's rhinos and
Elephants, DAILY MAVERICK (Nov. 28, 2014, 1:31 PM), http://www.dailymaverick.co
.za/article/2014-11-28-home-grown-corruption-is-killing-africas-rhinos-and-elephants/%20-
%20.VLBG2rktDIU#.VN4t3bk5DIU (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
32. Id.
4652016]
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enforcing its laws.33 As a result, domestic regulations are often
overlooked or simply ignored.3 4 Even if poachers are caught and
prosecuted, charges are generally viewed as negligible risks worth
taking in the face of high profits from the illegal ivory trade.3 5 When
combining this rampant corruption with limited funding for rangers
and weak penalties, this ultimately results in an inability to enforce
local laws. For this reason, domestic regulations in (1) Mozambique
and (2) Tanzania continue to provide little deterrence to a growing
black market ivory trade.
1. Mozambique's Domestic Safeguards
There are two main statutes that constitute the majority of
wildlife protection in Mozambique: Law No. 10 of July 7, 1999, and
Article 254 of the Mozambican Penal Code. 3 6
Law No. 10, and its various Articles, set the basic principles of
protection, preservation, and sustainable use of forest and wildlife
resources. 3 7 Under the oversight of the Office of Council Ministers, it
regulates Mozambique's forest and wildlife monitoring and
management, and is the primary legal protection for elephants and
rhinos.3 8
Most notably, Article 20 limits the hunting of specific wild
animals by establishing a quota system. 3 9 This requires hunters to
obtain a license of one of three varying degrees: a simple hunting
(caca por licenca simples), sport hunting (cac desportiva), or
commercial hunting license (caca commercial). 4 0 Articles 21, 22,
and 23, in turn, establish the appropriate instruments and hunting
practices allowed under each type of license. 4 1 Separate permits are
33. Michael J. Glennon, Article: Has International Law Failed the Elephant?, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 20 (1990).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Wildlfe Trafficking and Poaching: Mozambique, Library of Congress, LOC.GOV,
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/wildlife-poaching/mozambique.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
37. Id.
3 8. Id.
39. See Ceratotherium simum simum, SPECIESPLUS.NET, http://www.speciesplus.net
/#/taxonconcepts/1 2296/legal (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
40. Wildife Trafficking and Poaching: Mozambique, supra note 36.
41. Id.
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also required for the trade in ivory.4 2
Several Articles under Law No. 10 also explicitly detail the
means for legal enforcement. For example, only properly uniformed
and identified inspectors of forest and wildlife are able to seize and
arrest for violations.4 3 Additionally, they are able to run both
stationary and mobile surveillance posts if properly marked.4 4 This
also includes vehicle checkpoints that can be placed at random.4 5 Of
particular note, is the Law's explicit requirement for collaboration
and cooperation among citizens and local authorities to assist in the
reporting of illegal activity.4 6
Violations of Law No. 10's provisions can result in a variety of
punishments by monetary fine. Generally, acts resulting from
hunting or importing/exporting without a license result in minimal
penalties from $69.45 to $3,472.27.47 The amount of the fine is
largely left to the discretion of the decision maker, who can consider
a variety of aggravating factors including the location and season of
the illegal act and whether the courts are dealing with a first or
multiple-time offender. 4 8 Additionally, if the violation is committed
against a protected species like the elephant or rhino, wrongdoers can
expect the fine to be up to ten times the maximum under Article 41
of Law No. 10.49
The Mozambican Penal Code, on the other hand, is derived from
the state's criminal law and is the only way to impose jail time.5 0 Its
regulations closely mimic Law No. 10 in requiring proper hunting
licenses, but contrasts because it only speaks to hunting and not the
actual trafficking of wildlife. In most cases, penalties due to
violations of the Penal Code are extremely minimal, with
misdemeanors as the most serious charge. Accordingly, most illegal
poachers of elephants or rhinos generally expect no more than three
days in prison and/or a small fine.5 '
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Wildlife Trafficking and Poaching: Mozambique, supra note 36.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Overall, both Law No. 10 and the Mozambican Penal Code
provide little deterrence effect because there is little or no motivation
for poachers to cease their profitable conduct.5 2 Since the cost of
poaching only results in minimal monetary fines or mere
misdemeanors under either regulation, most are willing to risk the
punishment for the chance of making a much greater profit from the
ivory trade.5 3 As already shown, hefty profits up to $65,000 a
kilogram for rhino horn, can easily justify a mere three days in prison
or even a slightly stiffer monetary penalty.5 4 In the end, the fact that
poaching remains on the rise in Mozambique is a testament to the
fact that poachers view these domestic laws as nothing more than a
minor impediment. 5 Adding this to Mozambique's shortage of
funding for wildlife enforcement-often placing feeble numbers of
park rangers, assigned to animal refuges the size of Norway, and
against paramilitary poachers with automatic weapons-only
guarantees ongoing failure to stem the tide of poaching. 56 These
lopsided odds, easy hunting grounds, and minimal legal repercussions
have ultimately overwhelmed enforcement officers and ripened
Mozambique as one of the major sources for illegal ivory.
2. Tanzania's Domestic Safeguards
Tanzania's penal system employs a similar legal framework.
Currently, there are three main statutes in place to combat the black
market ivory trade: the Animal Welfare Act No. 19 of 2008, The
Wildlife Conservation Act No. 5 of 2009 (WCA), and the National
Parks Act (NPA).ss
52. Jinty Jackson, Elephant Poachers Plague Mozambique, AWT NEWS (Apr. 23,
2013), http://africanwildlifetrust.blogspot.com/2013/04/elephant-poachers-plague-mozamb
ique.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
53. See Glennon, supra note 33, at 20.
54. See id.; Gordon, supra note 14.
55. See Mozambique Taking Steps to Tackle Rhino Poaching, SAVE THE RHINo (Aug.
2013), http://www.savetherhino.org/latest news/news/788_mozambiquejtaking steps.tta
cklerhinopoaching (last visited Feb. 16, 2016); Paul Tyson supra note 16.
56. Glennon, supra note 33, at 4; Mozambique Poaching has Regional Effects,
VOCALOOK (July 31, 2013), http://www.vocalook.com/articles/mozambique-poaching-has-
regional-effects/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2016); Jackson, supra note 52.
57. Mozambique Taking Steps to Tackle Rhino Poaching, supra note 55.
58. Wildhfe Trafficking and Poaching: Tanzania, Library of Congress, Loc.Gov,
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/wildlife-poaching/tanzania.php (last visited Feb.16, 2016).
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The Animal Welfare Act No. 19 of 2008 recognizes three
fundamental points: "that (i) an animal is a sentient being; (ii) animal
welfare is an important aspect of any developed society which
reflects the degree of moral and cultural maturity of that society;
[and] (iii) animal welfare enhances livestock productivity and that a
human being has a moral obligation to care, respect and protect an
animal."5 9 While this Act focuses on a broad spectrum of topics
regarding animal cruelty and welfare in the wild and in captivity, the
primary sections relating to poaching are under sections "e" of Part
III and segments "a" and "f' of Part IV.
Section "e" of Part III details the proper methods of killing
livestock or wild animals. 6 0 The Act requires that "animal[s] shall be
slaughtered through a method which involves instantaneous
killing." 6' Sections "a" and "f' of Part IV, on the other hand, deal
with prohibited conduct. For instance, section "a" prohibits "cruelly
beat[ing], kick[ing], ill-treat[ing] ... tortur[ing] ... or terrify[ing] an
animal." 62 Additionally, section "f' forbids the use of poisonous or
injurious drugs on animals. A violation of any of these provisions
results in either imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or
a fine not surpassing $54.02.63
Currently, Tanzania appoints livestock field officers to act as
animal welfare inspectors in conducting random inspections. 64 The
chances, however, of them actually finding evidence while the
poacher is still present at the crime scene is minimal. Because such
highly sophisticated tracking techniques and efficient hunting
methods allow poachers to travel and extract ivory quickly,
confrontations with authorities are rare. 6 5 As a result, the Animal
Welfare Act is generally viewed as nothing more than legal text
without a means for enforcement. This is evidenced by systemic
illegal poaching practices that results in rhinos being taken down by
poisonous darts only to wake up without a horn and "bleed to death
59. The Animal Welfare Act (Tanz. 2008), http://www.tanzania.go.tz/egov-uploads/d
ocuments/TheAnimalWelfareAct,_2008_-_(ActNosw.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The Animal Welfare Act, supra note 62.
65. Mozambique Taking Steps to Tackle Rhino Poaching, supra note 55.
2016] 469
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
very painfully and slowly."66 These continued violations of the
Animal Welfare Act by poachers demonstrate the minimal effect (if
any) the Act has on the black market ivory trade.
The WCA, on the other hand, focuses on punitive measures for
the hunting of protected animals and the prohibition of certain
hunting techniques. 67 In this regard, the killing of any protected
animal is strictly prohibited in a game reserve, controlled area, or
wetlands reserve without a permit or license. 6 8 The WCA goes
further to classify animals on a category from one to three; one being
the most restrictive. 6 9 The goal behind this is to limit licenses for
those under stricter classifications. Currently elephants and rhinos
are under Category I and afforded the highest protections.7 0
Therefore, penalties range from five to ten years imprisonment
and/or a fine of $315 to $1,260.71
Certain hunting measures and practices are also prohibited under
the WCA. Section 65(1), for example, provides a detailed list of
banned methods.72 This includes the use of automatic or semi-
automatic firearms and poison. 73 Poachers caught employing illegal
hunting methods are punishable by one to three years imprisonment
and/or a fine ranging from $1260 to $2,520.74
Bans are also imposed against the "selling, buying, transporting,
accepting, exporting, or importing of trophies" of protected animal
species without a proper permit.7 5 Infringements of these provisions
can result in two to five years imprisonment and/or a fine of twice
the trophy's value. 7 6
Enforcement of the WCA is left to the Wildlife Authority, which
includes a paramilitary unit responsible for the "capturing and
photographing of wildlife and securing of trophies."7 7 While they are
66. Id.
67. Wildlife Trafficking and Poaching: Tanzania, supra note 58.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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given broad discretion to search, seize, and arrest, jurisdiction
excludes conservation areas and the national parks.78 These zones
fall under the regulations of the NPA, which aside from the area of
control, is identical to the WCA. 79 Additionally, the NPA appoints
the Trustees of the Tanzania National Parks to watch over the
country's conservation areas and sixteen national parks, which span
an area of over 42,000 square kilometers.80
There is no doubt that poachers potentially face numerous
charges under the WCA and NPA. Not only are they generally
indifferent to the regulations' requirements for licenses and permits,
but also often engage in prohibited hunting practices.8 1 This includes
the use of heavy weaponry and poisonous darts to sedate elephants
and rhinos.8 2 While there is recent evidence that Tanzania is
increasing their efforts to enforce laws under the WCA, by hiring
nine hundred additional staff members for the wildlife division,
installing twenty-four hour security guards at national park
entrances, and even implementing a shoot-on-sight policy for
poachers,83 rhino and elephant poaching remains on the rise.84 This
continuous growth in poaching can be attributed to Tanzania's sheer
geographic size. In all, the country's game rangers and enforcement
officers are expected to cover a 232,535 square kilometer area, which
is roughly the size of the United Kingdom.85
To put this in better perspective, one of Southern Tanzania's
well-known reserves, the Selous Game Reserve, spans a 55,000
square kilometer area. 8 6 While there are 285 wildlife rangers on full
staff in that park to cover territory essentially the size of Rwanda,
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See DAVIES, supra note 10, at 88.
82. John Burnett, Poachers Decimate Tanzania's Elephant Herds, NPR (Oct. 25, 2012)
http://www.npr.org/2012/10/25/163563426/poachers-decimate-tanzanias-elephant-herds;Rhino
Poaching Facts, African Wildlife Detective, http://www.africa-wildlife-detective.co m/r hino-
poaching.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
83. War on Rhino Poaching, Adventura (Feb. 15, 2014) http://www.aventu rasafaris.c
om/news/winning-the-war-on-rhino-poaching-in-tanzania; Salaam, supra note 14.
84. Id.
85. Salaam, supra note 14.
86. Chris Oke, Tanzania: On the Front Line of the War Against Poaching (May 31,
2014) http://phys.org/news/2014-05-tanzania-front-line-war-poaching.html.
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only about 150 are ever working simultaneously.87 This makes it
nearly impossible to catch poachers, and let alone, successfully out-
gun their "brand-new automatic rifles that put the rangers' firepower
to shame." 8 And given the rare chance that a poacher is caught, it is
nearly impossible to even bring him to trial since they "almost
always [get] enough money to grease the palms of anyone who
matters." 89 Accordingly, these "weak penalties meted out to those
caught ultimately only serve to further facilitate the trafficking of
animals" by encouraging others to take advantage of loose
protections and weak enforcement. 90 Overall, Tanzania's legal
system falls victim to many of the same problems in Mozambique
because the task for domestic legal enforcement is simply too
overwhelming in the face of weak penalties, permeating corruption
and the lack of government funding.
As evidenced from the legal protections in both countries, the
illegal ivory trade feeds on ineffective domestic laws. Unfortunately,
the current intemational response has not done much to alleviate this
concem since safeguards remain passive in nature and, are
accordingly, largely underutilized by individual states.
B. The International Response
Though the intemational community cannot be blamed for
complete inaction, it has taken an unfortunate backseat approach to
legal enforcement of both criminal violations and infringements of
its own regulations. The result is an underutilized system because it
relies completely on individual states, whom are already overrun by
corruption. The Convention on Intemational Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES) is a primary example. While CITES is the key
intemational method of curbing elephant and rhino poaching through
licensing and the regulation of imports/exports, it fails to enact a
unitary means to enforce its own procedures without individual state
assistance. 91 Similarly, the creation of numerous nongovernmental
87. Id.
8 8. Id.
89. DAVIES, supra note 10, at 94.
90. Id. at 36.
91. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
Preamble, supra note 29.
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organizations (NGOs) simply do not provide any meaningful method
to prosecute high-level criminals or enforce stricter poaching laws
domestically-which is the missing piece to this dilemma. For this
reason, current international efforts, through the establishment of
international conventions and NGO's, fall short of providing any
permanent solution to the dwindling elephant and rhino populations
in Mozambique and Tanzania.
CITES was enacted on July 1, 1975, and is one of the keystones
of international law to help preserve elephants and rhinos. 92 As its
name suggests, CITES covers only international trade, not any trade
or conduct within a country-though the parties to CITES usually
enact parallel domestic laws (like the federal Endangered Species
Act) intended to protect certain endangered species. 9 3 The main goal
of CITES, as stated in its Preamble, is to recognize "that wild fauna
and flora in their many beautiful and varied forms [are] an
irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the earth which must be
protected for this and the generations to come." 94 In doing so, CITES
attempts to assist individual states in the preservation of designated
fauna and flora mainly by providing passive assistance through
statistical monitoring and the limitation of imports/exports. 95
In this regard, two new programs were implemented specifically
to monitor elephant populations and ivory seizures in participating
states. "MIKE" or "Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants," was
one of these programs adopted during CITES' 41st annual meeting in
1999.96 In fulfilling MIKE's goal of measuring poaching in
participating states, CITES designated resources to assist in the long-
term management of elephant populations: by ". . . measur[ing] levels
and trends in the illegal hunting of elephants; ... determin[ing]
changes in these trends over time; and ... determining the factors
causing or associated with such changes, and ... assess[ing] in
particular to what extent observed trends are a result of any decisions
taken by the Conference of the Parties to CITES."9 7 In providing
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE), Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Mar. 25, 2015). http://www.ci
tes.org/eng/prog/mike/intro/index.shtml.
97. Id.
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statistical analysis through aerial and ground surveys of both elephant
populations and ongoing poaching activities, this measure hoped to
provide critical information to individual states like Tanzania and
Mozambique. 9 8
The Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS) was the other
control measure implemented by CITES in 1997 to measure ivory
seizures in various states. 99 This differed from MIKE because the
focus was on the "levels and trends in illegal trade, rather than the
illegal killing of elephants."100 Both MIKE and ETIS are just some
examples of CITES' efforts to curb poaching through research and
passive efforts.
One of CITES' most impactful functions, however, involves the
classification of the elephant and rhino species into one of three
protected appendices for the purposes of limiting imports/exports
internationally. 10 1 Each appendix indicates the level of restrictiveness
in regards to the import/export of the specific fauna and flora. 102 This
also includes specific limitations on the amount of ivory that
Mozambique and Tanzania can import/export legally with a
license.103
Appendix I is the most restrictive. Generally, species categorized
here are threatened with extinction and are subject to particularly strict
regulation, and any transport of wildlife or fauna is only authorized in
exceptional circumstances. 1 0 4 Specifically, imports/exports will
require a permit that will only be granted by the "Scientific Authority
of the State" when "such [transportation] will not be detrimental to
the survival of the species."105 Moreover, there is also a requirement
for a reexport certificate that "may be granted only when the
reexporting state is satisfied that the specimen was imported into that
98. Id.
99. The Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS), Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, http://www.cites.org/eng/prog/ETIS
/index.php.
100. Id.
101. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
Preamble, supra note 29, at Article III-V.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. Glennon, supra note 33, at 11.
105. Id.
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state in accordance with the Convention." 06
Appendix II provides intermediate protection for all species that
are currently not threatened with extinction but may become so
without regulation.1 0 7  Though the limitations regarding
export/reexport are similar to Appendix I, the rules regarding import
are far less rigorous. In fact, no import permit is required and imports
for commercial purposes are also allowed.'
Lastly, Appendix III guarantees the least protection to 'all
species which any Party identifies as being subject to regulation
within its jurisdiction for the purposes of preventing or restricting
exploitation. "'109 Unlike species categorized in Appendices I and II,
the limitations for those under Appendix III are primarily derived
from the laws of the exporting state."10
Though "[t]he African elephant, [or Loxodonta Africana], was
first listed in Appendix III of the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 1976 ... [it]
... moved to Appendix II the following year. In 1990, after nearly a
decade during which African elephant populations dropped by almost
50%, the species was moved to Appendix I of CITES.""' In 1997,
though some recovering populations in certain African regions were
moved back to Appendix II with strict limitations on trade in ivory,
elephants in Mozambique and Tanzania have remained under
Appendix I protections.11 2 Moreover, the two species of rhino
surviving in both countries, the black rhino (Diceros bicornis) and
white rhino (Ceratotherium simum), have been categorized under
Appendix I since April 2, 1977.1"
So while CITES has provided numerous modes of assistance to
combat poaching through MIKE, ETIS, and import/export limitations,
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. African Elephants, US Fish & Wildlife Service (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.fws.g
ov/international/animals/african-elephants.html. See Species Plus, supra note 39.
112. See Species Plus, supra note 39.
113. A Report From the IUCN Species Survival Commission (IUCN/SSC) African and
Asian Rhino Specialist Groups and TRAFFIC to the CITES Secretariat, African and Asian
Rhinoceroses- Status, Conservation and Trade, (Nov. 20, 2009) http://cites.org/commo
n/cop/1 5/doc/E15-45-01A.pdf, Id.
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it ultimately fails to provide an effective deterrent because its
measures are passive in nature and enforcement is left to dwindling
domestic state actors. This includes the states' appointment of their
own Management and Scientific Authorities to administer and
implement CITES' import/export safeguards. Even MIKE and ETIS
require states to appoint their own national representatives who, in
turn, help implement their statistical analysis. This heavy reliance on
individual states has certainly proved ineffective for countries like
Mozambique and Tanzania who are already infested by rampant
corruption and a clear lack of funding.
As evidenced by increased patterns of bribery at the highest
levels of local government and rises in poaching, the African
elephant's upgrade to Appendix I has done little for Mozambique
and Tanzania. There, the statistical evidence showed that, though the
shifting of African elephants to Appendix I in 1990 "relieved the
pressure and key elephant populations began recovering ... it was
soon undermined" by "the vast profits available from poaching."1 14
Recent reports from Mozambique supported such a claim when they
started identifying increasing instances of local corruption, including
the involvement of game rangers to assist poachers to find areas with
high populations of elephants and rhinos.1 15 These instances of
bribery often involved a simple payment of $80, which was
equivalent to a game ranger's salary for one month.' 16 Ultimately,
enticing bribes and the evidence of corruption that erupted within
Tanzania's own government are primary reasons local enforcement
of CITES' regulations are often unsuccessful.
The poaching surge in Tanzania and Mozambique subsequent to
CITES upgrading the elephant and rhino to Appendix I in 1990 also
supports this claim. As evidenced by MIKE's own statistics, the
frequency of poaching drastically increased from 2002 through
2011.117 This is illustrated through the utilized "PIKE" value, which
114. Environmental Investigation Agency, supra note 13, at 3; see Glennon, supra note
33, at 20; see Elephant Ivory Trade-Related Timeline with Relevance to the United States,
Humane Society International (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.hsi.org/assets/pdfs/Elephant
_RelatedTradeTimeline.pdf
115. Rhinos Now Extinct in Mozambique: experts, DAILY NEWS (May 2, 2013) http://ww
w.nydailynews.com/news/world/mozambique-rhinos-extinct-experts-article-1.1333267.
116. Id.
117. Sixteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Bangkok, Thailand, Monitoring
the Illegal Killing of Elephants, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora (Mar. 3-14, 2013), http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/16/doc/E-CoPl6-
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stands for "the proportion of illegally killed elephants."" 8 Under this
test, the total number of illegally killed elephants discovered are
divided by the overall number of elephant carcasses encountered at
each site.1 19 The result yields a proportion with higher numbers
representing increased frequencies of poaching.1 2 0 Accordingly, the
earliest recorded PIKE value in Mozambique's Cabora Bassa region
in 2002 measured a proportion of 0 and rose radically to .83 in 2011.
Similarly, the 2002 PIKE value in Tanzania's Ruaha Rungwa region
gauged a value of .1 and swelled to .94 in 2011.121 Tanzania was
even identified as one of the largest sources of illegal ivory during
this time, with close to twenty tons seized between 2010 and 2013.122
Rhinos also faced a similar fate despite CITES' protections. For
example, the black rhino was listed in Appendix I since April 02,
1977.123 At that time, they numbered over 10,000 in population.1 2 4
However, their numbers have decreased to an estimated 100 in 2011
and to near extinction today. 12 5 Mozambique was no different and
fell prey to increased rhino poaching that has left both white and
black rhinos on the "brink of vanishing."' 2 6 Such rapid increases of
poaching, despite the enactment of CITES' passive regulatory
safeguards, verify its inability to combat this elusive ivory trade.
NGOs represent another form of international aid against the
illegal trade in ivory. While many exist today, the most influential
organizations are the International Union for Conservation of Nature
(IUCN), the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and the Trade
Records Analysis for Fauna and Flora in International Commerce
53-0 1.pdf.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Salaam, supra note 14.
123. Black Rhino, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.cites.org/eng/gallery/species/mammal/bl
ack rhino.html.
124. Protecting Endangered Animals Preserving Ecosystems, Wildlife Now (Mar. 03,
2015), http://www.wildlifenow.com/black-rhino.html; Tanzania Receive Three Black
Rhinos from UK, Tanzania National Parks (Mar. 03, 2015), http://www.tanzaniaparks.co
m/news/news_3_black_rhinos.html (Mar. 03, 2015).
125. Protecting Endangered Animals Preserving Ecosystems, supra note 134.
126. Rhinos now extinct in Mozambique: experts, supra note 115; Sixteenth Meeting of
the Conference of the Parties, supra note 117.
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(TRAFFIC). Similar to CITES and its numerous regulations, NGOs
are unable to actively assist states in enforcing prosecution and the
laws they endorse. While they are able to contribute precious
resources in the study and analysis of elephants and rhinos, more is
needed to actually prevent the rise of poaching.
The IUCN, for example, "focuses on valuing and conserving
nature, ensuring effective and equitable governance of its use, and
deploying nature-based solutions to global challenges in climate,
food and development." 1 27 One of their most effective tools in
regards to the diminishing numbers of elephants and rhinos is the
hosting of the World Conservation Congress every four years.1 2 8
This is a meeting of thousands of global leaders to talk about the
world's most pressing environmental challenges, including the black
market ivory trade. 1 2 9 Such efforts to consolidate global leaders
under one roof and foster more unified efforts to combat
environmental challenges have led to the successful creation of several
online databases, including the IUCN Red List of Threatened
Species.' 3 0 This extensive online source provides detailed assessments
and backgrounds of selected species threatened with extinction. 13 1
Accordingly, partner states are able to access their databases and better
gauge their elephant and rhino populations as well as local poaching
trends.
The WWF has a similar function to the IUCN: to "conserve
nature and reduce the most pressing threats to the diversity of life on
Earth."1 3 2 Some of its most influential work involves its collaborative
efforts with global business leaders, such as Coca Cola and Avon, to
raise environmental awareness in the black market ivory trade.13 3
This includes the provisions of monetary funding and wildlife
experts in order to better implement various conservation projects
127. International Union for Conservation of Nature, http://www.iucn.org/about/ (last
visited Mar. 25, 2015).
128. World Conservation Congress, Hawaii, https://portals.iucn.org/2016congress/con
tent/about (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
129. Id.
130. The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, http://www.iucnredlist.org/about (last
visited Mar. 25, 2015).
131. Id.
132. World Wild Life, http://www.worldwildlife.org/about (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
133. Corporate Partnerships, WWF, https://www.worldwildlife.org/partnership-categor
ies/corporate-partnerships (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
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around the world.1 34
Lastly, TRAFFIC works "globally on trade in wild animals and
plants in the context of both biodiversity conservation and
sustainable development." 35 It focuses on analyzing wildlife trends,
developing consumer insight, and encouraging governments like
Tanzania and Mozambique to change their poaching laws.1 3 6 Recent
efforts concentrate on the poaching of rhinos and the illegal ivory
trade. Since 2000, TRAFFIC has also partnered with the WWF and
IUCN to highlight major concerns to CITES, launched intensive
studies of poaching, and published expansive reports to the global
community to raise awareness.137
As evidenced, NGO's have provided monumental funding and
resources in the fight against the black market ivory trade in
Mozambique and Tanzania. However, all of them share one common
shortcoming: Their efforts are passive and ultimately rely on
individual states to implement them. Similar to the enforcement of
CITES, strict reliance on individual state autonomy cannot resolve a
growing and systemic ivory trade. Instead, as I will propose in the
next section, we must encourage active international involvement
through prosecution. As such, the international crime of genocide is
just one device for imposing criminal punishments on poachers and
high-level criminals in the black market ivory trade. Though this
strategy stretches the use of a human crime towards an animal
species, I believe the application of genocide recognizes fundamental
morals that cannot be overlooked.
III. A Novel Answer for a Novel Challenge: Applying
Provisions Regarding Genocide to Poaching
The black market ivory trade has grown arguably immune to
Mozambique and Tanzania's domestic safeguards as well as the
current international protections in place. Absent a major change at
the domestic enforcement level, the only option to prevent extinction
134. Our Work, WWF (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.worldwildlife.org/initiatives.
135. TRAFFIC, http://www.traffic.org/overview/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
136. Id.
137. TRAFFIC's engagement on African rhinoceros conservation and the global trade in
rhinoceros horn (Mar. 25, 2015), TRAFFIC, http://www.traffic.org/rhinos/.
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of elephants and rhinos may be an innovative international strategy
to combat the scourge of poaching.
During this Section, I suggest an expansion of the role of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), the international community's
criminal prosecuting body, by suggesting the enforcement of the
crime of genocide against elephants and rhinos. As such, I will
demonstrate satisfaction of both (A) procedural and (B) substantive
requirements to establish genocide of these species as a crime that
can be prosecuted in the ICC. And while this may suggest a radical
proposal, it is a necessary one to effectively punish those heinous
acts resulting in the total or partial destruction of the elephant and
rhino species.
A. Procedural Requirements
The ICC was a by-product of the Rome Statute of the ICC and
was formally established in 2002 as a way to provide "a permanent
international criminal court." 13 8 Up to that point, the international
community relied on ad hoc tribunals to resolve regional conflicts.1 3 9
Because they were often limited in jurisdiction and scope to specific
situations, "there was general agreement that an independent,
permanent criminal court was needed." 1 4 0 Moreover, in light of more
recent acts of genocide in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, a
more stable prosecuting body was seen as necessary to efficiently
investigate cases, prosecute crimes, and impose sentences. 141
Unlike other international organs, the ICC is solely responsible
for "bring[ing] cases against individuals accused of committing
crimes as part of a situation."1 42 A situation generally "refers to a
group of crimes within the Court's jurisdiction committed within a
particular geographic and temporal context." 4 3 This is generally
triggered by one of three international bodies: a State Party to the
138. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 139-140.
139. Id. at 99.
140. About the Court, International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc
/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2015); see
VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 99.
141. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 139; About the Court, supra note 140.
142. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 141.
143. Id. at 140.
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Rome Statute of the ICC, the ICC Prosecutor himself, or the Security
Council.1 4 4 After there is an appropriate trigger from one of the three
international bodies, the prosecutor must demonstrate the existence
of jurisdiction and "admissibility" during a preliminary examination,
in order to proceed to a full investigation and trial.1 45
1. Jurisdiction
In the international context, this term carries a slightly different
meaning. Here, there are three types of jurisdiction required:
national/territorial, subject matter, and temporal jurisdiction.1 4 6 The
prosecutor must satisfy all of them to move forward.
National/territorial jurisdiction is a requirement only if a State
Party or the ICC Prosecutor refers the case; Security Council
referrals are exempt from this requirement. In order to establish this
jurisdictional aspect, the criminal conduct must either occur "on the
territory" of the referring State Party or "the person accused of the
crime" must be a national of the State Party.1 4 7 Nonparty states,
however, can also accept the jurisdiction of the ICC by ad hoc
declaration. 14 8
Jurisdiction ratione temporis or temporal jurisdiction, on the
other hand, takes into account when the crime was committed.1 4 9
Generally, the "ICC only has jurisdiction for acts performed after the
Rome Treaty came into effect on July 1, 2002" or subsequent to state
ratification of the treaty.' 5 0
Lastly, subject matter jurisdiction is "limited to the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole." This
includes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes
of aggression.'51
144. DAVID J. BIEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 64 (3rd ed. 2010);
Permanent and Non-Permanent Members, United Nations Security Council, http://www.u
n.org/en/sc/members/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
145. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 144-45, 152-54.
146. Id. at 144-45.
147. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 12, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
148. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 144.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187
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Here, all forms of jurisdiction can be satisfied for Mozambique
and Tanzania in connection with elephant and rhino poaching. In
regards to Mozambique, though they are not a party to the Rome
Statute, national/territorial jurisdiction can be satisfied by the state's
ad hoc declaration.1 52 Even if Mozambique refuses to voluntarily
submit themselves to the Rome Statute, the Security Council can
refer the situation on their behalf if they feel it is in the interest of
international peace and security. 153 In regards to Tanzania, because
they are a state party to the Rome Statute, the ICC has
national/territorial jurisdiction over events occurring in the state. 154
Jurisdiction ratione temporis is also satisfied for both states.
Mozambique is limited to situations occurring after the Rome
Statute's implementation on July 1, 2002, because they are not a
State Party. 5 However, because Tanzania has been a state party
since August 20, 2002, the ICC will have jurisdiction for situations
occurring after this date. Finally, as I will discuss in detail during the
next subsection, subject matter jurisdiction is also satisfied because
the crime of genocide is applicable to the situation in Mozambique
and Tanzania.
All three forms of jurisdiction can be met here for both states.
2. Admissibility
Admissibility analysis is also part of the prosecutor's
preliminary phase. 156 There are two considerations during this phase:
"complementarity" and "gravity."1 5 7
Complementarity accounts for "whether genuine investigations
U.N.T.S. 90.
152. MOZAMBIQUE, Coalition for the International Criminal Court (last updated Aug.
2008) http://www.icenow.org/?mod=country&iduct- 119; VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at
145.
153. See VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 141.
154. United Republic of Tanzania, International Criminal Court, (last updated Nov. 3,
2003) http://www.ice-cpi.int/en-menus/asp/states%20parties/african%20states/Pages/united
%20republic%200f/o20tanzania.aspx.
155. United Republic of Tanzania, International Criminal Court, (last updated Nov. 3,
2003) http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/asp/states%20parties/african%20states/Pages/united
%20republic%20of%20tanzania.aspx.
156. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 145.
157. Id. at 145, 150.
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or prosecutions have [already] been undertaken by [domestic
governments] with jurisdiction over the matter."' 5 8 The goal here is
to avoid a duplicate international investigation when there is a
pending domestic charge.1 5 9 Though there are a number of factors
considered, the prosecutor can consider (1) whether the actor is
undergoing a domestic proceeding for the same crime, (2) whether
the domestic proceeding was delayed in a manner that was
inconsistent with an intent to bring the individual concerned to
justice, and (3) whether the proceeding was conducted independently
or impartially.`0
The second component of admissibility measures "situational
gravity," which is the seriousness of potential cases.161 Here, the
prosecutor determines, by weighing both quantitative and qualitative
elements, which "situations are sufficiently grave to bring before the
court." 6 2 Items of particular concern are "the number of direct and
indirect victims, the extent of the damage caused by the crimes, and
their geographical or temporal spread." 6 3
Here, situations regarding the black market ivory trade in
Mozambique and Tanzania are mostly admissible, depending on the
individual circumstances. In regards to complementarity, while there
are existing domestic proceedings, they are frequently ineffective or
dismissed without a trial.1 6 4 As evidenced by those poachers who are
arrested and released after a payment of bribes or fined without
further investigation, domestic prosecutions of poachers involved in
the black market ivory trade are increasingly rare.1 65 Therefore, as
long as the Prosecutor can show instances of governmental
158. Id. at 146.
159. International charges can be prosecuted in domestic courts as long as the criminal
conduct fits the definition of a domestic crime. For instance, acts of genocide can be
prosecuted as murder as long as all the elements are present under the prosecuting state's
definition of the crime. In fact, today the majority of international criminal charges are
brought before domestic courts instead of the ICC due to more efficient prosecutorial
processes at the local level. The ICC recognizes this and will often raise complementarity
issues in order to transfer a case from international to state court. VAN SCHAACK, supra note
1, at 32-33.
160. See VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 146.
161. Id. at 148.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 148-149.
164. See DAVIES, supra note 10, at 93-94.
165. See Jackson, supra note 52.
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corruption, he can prove that existing domestic proceedings are not
conducted with the principal intent of bringing justice. Accordingly,
a demonstration of the absence of genuine legal proceedings will
generally satisfy complementarity.
In addition, gravity is well-established through the sheer number
of elephant and rhino deaths and the existence of heinous poaching
practices. As shown in the first section, elephants and rhinos have
been a primary target of systemic killing, leaving them maimed,
crippled, or worse. With elephants estimated to disappear completely
by 2020 and rhino populations barely intact in Mozambique and
Tanzania, the black market ivory trade has left a deafening effect on
their respective populations. 16 6 Therefore, gravity can be established
not only by showing the correlation between the decrease in elephant
and rhino populations with poaching, but also the manner in which
these slaughters are committed.
Therefore, admissibility is arguably satisfied as long as the
specific circumstances warrant complementarity and gravity.
Ultimately, while every situation may vary in context and shift
the satisfaction of the various jurisdictional and admissibility
elements, most poachers and high-level criminals involved in the
black market ivory trade are well within the ICC's procedural grasp.
B. Substantive Elements
Today, the ICC relies on the narrow interpretation of Article 6 of
the Rome Statute to define the substantive requirements for
genocide:
any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the
group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group;
or (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
166. Gordon, supra note 14; see Revealing the Cruelty Inflicted on Rhinos, supra note
17; see Glennon, supra note 33, at 3.
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another group. 167
Under this definition, the Prosecutor has three distinct
requirements: to establish the protected class according to nationality,
ethnicity, race, or religion; actionable conduct; and the specific intent
to destroy the group in whole or in part.
However, the crime of genocide need not be derived from the
strict textual interpretation of the Rome Statute because it is "not the
sole authority on the crime's" definition.1 68 Contrarily, international
law can be derived from a variety of sources: international
conventions or statutes; custom; general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations; and judicial decisions and teachings of qualified
publicists or of various nations. 1 6 9 Moreover, custom, or customary
international law, has long-accepted a policy-based approach that
focuses on the moral and social purposes of the law and not
necessarily the strict textual meaning of a statute. 17 0
Customary international law remains one of the most "powerful"
and "subliminal" foundations.' 7 1 In order to prove its existence, there
must be evidence that the "rule has been followed as a 'general
practice,' and has been 'accepted as law."' 72 Due to varying cultural
and political differences between states, customary international law
can vary drastically between countries. However, there are some
customs that are so well-recognized that they are universally adopted
as customary international law. These peremptory practices represent
"a higher law" or jus cogens norm: one that is "universally
condemned ... [making] perpetrators ... enemies of all people."1 7 3
Because they are so significant, the international community allows
universal jurisdiction or any State to prosecute for its violations.
Additionally, in many cases, they can also override contradicting
statutes, such as the Rome Statute.
Similar to Justice Jackson's plea for judicial action based on the
overall betterment of mankind, I argue that the prohibition of
167. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 6, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
168. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 5, at 2261.
169. BIEDERMAN, supra note 144, at 13.
170. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 1021.
171. BIEDERMAN, supra note 144, at 16.
172. Id.
173. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 5, 2261, 2279; id. at 25.
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genocide is a jus cogens norm that is not meant to take on a narrow
textual reading, like the one found in the Rome Statute of the ICC.
Both state practice and state acceptance into law have certified this
assertion through the customary prosecution of genocide in various
countries through universal jurisdiction-an international practice
only accepted for violations of jus cogens norms. "The International
Court of Justice (ICJ),'7 4 for example, made this clear when it
[declared].. .that the prohibition of genocide is "'binding on states,
even without any contractual obligation."'l75 In essence, they
encouraged the prosecution of genocide even when states had no
jurisdiction or causal link to the individual committing the crime.
Numerous other precedents have also clarified genocide as ajus
cogens violation through state practice and acceptance into law.
Starting with Israel v. Eichmann, the Israeli Courts tried the
defendant for genocide on the basis of universal jurisdiction derived
from a violation of jus cogens norms. Then the US Courts also
acknowledged the same principles in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky when
they agreed to extradite the defendant to another state for genocide
by universal jurisdiction. Ultimately, when these courts adopted the
principles of universal jurisdiction to prosecute for genocide, they
recognized it as a jus cogens violation through state practice and
acceptance into law. 176
But aside from the recognition of genocide as a violation of ajus
cogens norm, its precise substantive requirements are also developed
from international peremptory norms. In this regard, the international
community adopts a broader application of genocide (as compared to
the Rome Statute's definition) that can be shown through examples
of customary state practice. As evidenced through the initial drafting
attempts of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), that eventually led to the
adoption of genocide's definition in the Rome Statute, the foundation
of the crime rested on broader principles of humanity rather than a
174. The International Court of Justice (IC1) is the principal judicial organ of the U.N.
that can issue judgments on international law disputes or advisory opinions at the request of
the U.N. General Assembly, which is described in detail below. Different from the ICC, the
ICJ can only issue nonbinding advisory opinions and does not take part in the actual
prosecution of international crimes. The Court, International Court of Justice, http://www.i
cj-cij.org/court/index.php?pl=1 (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
175. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 5, 2275.
176. Id.
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focus on restricted protected groups.'77 Accordingly, customary
international law's understanding of genocide must "supersede
[those] conflicting or less expansive treaty provisions" found in the
Rome Statute.1 78
As evidenced from the first attempts at establishing an accepted
definition of genocide subsequent to the Nuremberg trials, it was
clear that many preferred a broader application that focused on
morality.1 7 9 In fact, after scholars and government representatives
struggled to label the Nazis' targeted attacks against the Jews, it was
not until jurist and Polish scholar, Raphael Lemkin, recommended
the term of "genocide" to describe the concentrated "effort to
eradicate human collectivities," that the international community
finally began to use the term. 80 "For Lemkin, the critical element of
genocide was that while singular acts are aimed at individuals, the
broader aim of genocide is to destroy entire . . . collectivities."'81
Rather than limit its application to certain protected groups, Lemkin
focused on a policy rationale that the "'legal conscience of mankind
... [was] absolutely essential to coexistence in the international
community."'l82
During the General Assembly's 55th session, they also adopted
a similar understanding of genocide that described a "[b]roader"
application. 183 As evident from the Assembly resolution, they
unanimously adopted Lemkin's formulation of genocide as
customary international law by focusing on its "denial of the right of
existence [that] shocks the conscience of mankind . .. and is contrary
177. The Genocide Convention was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 9,
1948. Its definition of genocide was subsequently adopted in Article VI of the Rome Statute
after its implementation on July 1, 2002. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, supra note 167.
178. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 5, 2275.
179. Id. at 2259.
180. Id. at 2262-63.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2261, 2273.
183. The General Assembly "is the main deliberative organ of the United Nations ...
[and] is composed of representatives of all Member States." "While the decisions of the
Assembly have no legally binding force for Governments, they carry the weight of world
opinion on major international issues" which are expressed in various resolutions adopted
by the Assembly. About the General Assembly, 55th Session General Assembly,
http://www.un.org/ga/55/bgrdga.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).
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to the law and the spirit and aims of the United Nations."1 84 i
accepting this interpretation of genocide, that did not delineate
between protected groups, the General Assembly established state
practice and acceptance of the definition of genocide as it was
historically perceived by Lemkin--one that focused on overall
humanity and the heinousness of eradicating entire groups instead of
particular subsects.
Accordingly the 55th Session of the General Assembly arguably
exhibited state practice and general acceptance into law since their
opinions were often understood to carry the weight of the world's
opinion. Through reiterating Lemkin's point that the international
community needed to recognize genocide as a violation of a jus
cogens norm due to its "great losses to humanity" that ran "contrary
to moral law and the spirit and aims of the United Nations," they
ultimately agreed to apply genocide broadly rather than limit its
application to particular protected groups (nationality, ethnicity, race,
or religion) as described in the Rome Statute. 8 5
The 55th General Assembly's opinion has also been followed by
other incidences of state practice as well. For example, after the mass
killings in Khmer Rouge, when the Court failed to label the incident
as genocide, there was an uproar from many international
communities and scholars that demanded the incident be labeled as
genocide.1 86 There, despite "nearly a quarter of the population"
"reportedly killed during [the] . . . purge," along with numerous
examples of precise targeting, mass exterminations and torture, the
Court never found incidents of genocide because the victims were
killed on the basis of their political affiliation instead of one of the
protected categories under the Rome Statute's definition.1 87
Therefore, in opposition to the court, a large portion of the
global community, including historians, sociologists, journalists, and
laypersons took the same position as Lemkin and the 55th Session of
the General Assembly. As such, they argued that the conduct and
character of the atrocities in Khmer Rouge were the primary
indicators of genocide and not the victims' protected class. Through
184. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 5, at 2263.
185. Id.
186. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 5, at 2269; Prak Chan Thul, Khmer Rouge Genocide:
Justice Delayed May be Justice Denied, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.reuters.
com/article/2013/03/11/us-cambodia-court-idUSBRE9290HM20130311.
187. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 5, at 2269, 2270; Thul, supra note 186.
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comparing the conduct in the Rwandan and Yugoslavian genocide,
they hoped to convince the court of this point and dispel the mistake
of focusing on a narrow textual reading of the Rome Statute's
definition of genocide. 8 8
In the 1994 Rwandan civil unrest, for example, the
unimaginable atrocities that led to the death of "[b]etween eight-
hundred thousand and one million men, women and children" was
labeled as genocide. 8 9 Similarly, international courts depicted the
Yugoslavia conflict from 1992 through 1995 as genocide because it
resulted in the deaths of close to 100,000 people and involved some
of the "most violent" events against certain ethnicities.' 90 In
comparing the conduct and character of the mass killings in Khmer
Rouge, which took the lives of nearly a quarter of the population,
there was no reason why the conflict was any different. Accordingly,
the focus on the overall inhumanity of the mass destruction rather
than the specific classification of the victims' protected class was
arguably the more accurate benchmark to define a crime of genocide.
Aside from numerous examples of state practice, accepting a
broader definition of genocide, customary international law has also
accepted a general policy-based argument that supports the Lemkin
conception of genocide "[w]here there is ambiguity or uncertainty" in
the statute. This contention also supports the focus on moral and social
purposes rather than the narrow interpretation of the Rome Statute.
In Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, the defendant was charged with
numerous international crimes. In his rebuttal, he asserted duress as a
complete defense to justify the voluntary slaughter of innocent
victims. Because there was no clear international statute regarding
duress as a complete defense, the court looked to various sources of
domestic law to establish customary practice. In doing so, they found
numerous state definitions and came to rely on the United States
penal code.' 9' Under this understanding, duress remained a general
188. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 5, at 2271.
189. See Genocide in Rwanda, United Human Rights Council, http://ww w.unitedhuma
nrights.org/Genocide/genocide-in_rwanda.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2015); United Nations
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, http://www.unictr.org/en/genocide (last visited
Feb. 12, 2015).
190. Florence Hartmann, Bosnia, Crimes of War, http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/
bosnia/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2015); Bosnia Genocide, History, http://www.history.com
/topics/bosnian-genocide (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
191. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 1016.
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defense to all crimes, disregarding the innocence of the victim.
Despite this, the court believed policy should be the primary
consideration before relying on a strict textual application of the US
law. As such, they focused on the "humanitarian, moral and social
purposes of the law."l 92 Because international law was not meant to
facilitate the slaughter of innocent people, they overruled the US
interpretation and did not allow duress as a complete defense in
international law.
Similar to the original Lemkin conception of genocide, the
Erdemovic Court focused on the fundamental goals and policies of
international law rather than strict textual interpretation.
Accordingly, the "most elementary principles of morality" rather
than the Rome Statute's definition of genocide can be applied as
customary international law. Following this rationale, I argue that the
massacre of elephants and rhinos can be prosecuted as a violation of
the jus cogens norm to prohibit genocide. Because customary
international law focuses on the "broader aim of destroying [an]
entire ... collectivity," the combination of lethal poaching practices
and mass exterminations is certainly enough to sustain an inference
of genocide.
Any other argument not only discounts the jus cogens norm
prohibiting genocide but also supports the inevitable collapse of
Mozambique and Tanzania's economy and wildlife. Tourism, for
instance, accounts for thirteen to seventeen percent of Tanzania's
GDP (the largest source of foreign exchange) and directly employs
over 400,000 people.1 93 Moreover, photographic safaris in the Selous
generate an income of $1.6 million. 1 9 4 As such, the survival of the
elephant and rhino species is as crucial to both states as is their own
state stability.1 95
Ultimately, customary international law's acceptance of Lemkin's
understanding of genocide remains a hopeful proposition in the
application of the crime as an international charge. Nonetheless, even
192. Id. at 1021.
193. Wildlife Trafficking and Poaching: Mozambique, supra note 36; see Gordon, supra
note 14.
194. V. Booth & 1. Games, Financial Potential of the Selous Game Reserve and its
Bufferzones, Price Waterhouse Zimbabwe, http://www.wildlife-baldus.com/download/nr21.pdf
(last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
195. See Glennon, supra note 33, at 8; see Gordon, supra note 14; see Wildhfe
Trafficking and Poaching: Mozambique, supra note 36.
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if the prohibition of genocide as ajus cogens norm falls short, I argue
that the three genocidal elements under the Rome Statute can still be
satisfied: (1) that elephants and rhinos are inclusive in the definition as
a protected class; (2) the "mens rea, which gives genocide its specialty
and distinguishes it from ... other crimes against international
humanitarian law," and (3) genocidal conduct. 196
1. Elephants and Rhinos Fall Within Genocide's Protected
Class
The first threshold requires the targeted victims to be classified
as a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.1 9 7 Under the
Notenbhom decision,
A national group was defined as a collection of people
who were perceived to share a legal bond based on
common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights
and duties; an ethnic group was generally defined as a
group whose members shared a common language or
culture; racial group [was] based on the hereditary
physical traits ... identified with a geographical
region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national, or
religious factors; and a religious group was one whose
members shared the same religion, denomination or
mode of worship.1 98
While the use of "people" generally excludes animals, courts are
evolving and adapting a more unconventional application that is
more inclusive of groups not specified by statute. Moreover, many
courts are even revolutionizing their domestic laws, which have
historically applied to human beings, to allow for animals as a
protected category.
In the case of Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Akayesu was indicted and
ultimately charged for the crime of genocide, among other
196. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 506, 512.
197. Id. at 497.
198. Id. at 504.
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international crimes. 199 His main role in the conflict, as bourgmestre
(town chief) of Taba, led to over 2,000 Tutsis massacred as well as
numerous other acts of sexual violence, beatings, and murders.200
Here, the major question was whether the targeting of Tutsis
demonstrated directed violence against an "ethnic" group as
classified under the Rome Statute. Even though the classification of
"Tutsi" historically referred to an individual's lineage, the Tribunal
held that it satisfied as an ethnical organization since understandings
of group classifications can "shift over time ... [and] ... the group,
the definition of the group to which one feels allied may, change
over time." 201 Moreover, it was more important that the classification
represent a "stable and permanent group" than a strictly ethnical
collection. 2 02
Additionally, in a 2014 landmark case, an Argentine court
recognized the human qualities of an animal. Here, "Sandra, a 29-
year-old Sumatran orangutan at the Buenos Aires Zoo," through
counsel, challenged the legality of her detention or imprisonment.2 03
In this case, the court held that the ape had sufficient cognitive
functions and should be granted human right freedoms. 204 Other
countries, like France have also followed suit. For example, in a
recent 2015 victory by the French Animal Rights Organization, a bill
was approved that essentially upgraded animals' privileges to those
of human beings in many respects.2 0 5 Long recognized as property
and nothing more than the equivalence of an "armchair" in French
199. Id. at 497.
200. Prosecutor v. Akayesu (1998) Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 7 (Sept. 2, 1998).
201. See VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 497, 503.
202. Id. at 505.
203. Richard Lough, Captive Orangutan has Human Right to Freedom, Argentine Court
Rules, REUTERS (last updated Dec. 21, 2014 3:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/20
14/12/2 1/us-argentina-orangutan-idUSKBNOJZOQ620141221.
204. See id.; see Alejandro Alba, Argentina court grants Sandra, an orangutan, human
legal rights, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (last updated Dec. 22, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://ww
w.nydailynews.com/news/world/argentinian-court-grants-sandra-orangutanhuman-rights-art
icle-1.2053464.
205. Tania Steere, Ruff Justice! French Dogs Voted 'Living Beings After Centuries of
Slumming It as 'Personal Property' (...and it means wealthy Parisiennes can leave their
fortunes to them), DAILY MAIL (Apr. 17, 2014) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-260
6301/Ruff-justice-French-dogs-voted-living-beings-centuries-slumming-personal-propertyme
ans-wealthy-Parisiennes-leave-fortunes-them.html.; Not 'Furniture' Any More: Animals in
France Get Status Upgrade After 200 yrs, RT (Nov. 15, 2014) http://rt.com/news/202155-
franc e-animals-status-furniture/.
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law, these animals can now be subjects of shared custody in divorce
proceedings or a source for pain and suffering damages in tort cases;
concepts generally associated with humans victims in most other
countries.
Here, both cases show the Court's willingness to recognize other
protected groups outside the Rome Statute's limited definition of
genocide. For one, the Akayesu standard, classifying groups by how
stable and permanent they are, as opposed to the narrow and textual
requirement of national, ethnic, racial, or religious categorization,
can allow for the classification of the elephant and rhino as a steady
and identifiable species. Furthermore, in regards to the more obvious
discrepancy that animals are not inclusive in the textual definition of
a targetable group for genocide, recent animal rights case, like
Sandra the orangutan, shows proof to the contrary. And though
Sandra's case involves a domestic proceeding, it certainly reflects the
international perception of animals as more than mere property, but
as individuals worthy of a protected legal status.
Accordingly, this element can be arguably satisfied. And while
animal rights cases, like those in Argentina and France, remain as
aberrational decisions, there is no doubt that Courts are making a
progressive movement towards accepting animal victims in
traditionally recognized human crimes.
2. Mens Rea
Mens rea describes the "criminal intent" of the defendant.206 In a
case for genocide, it requires the intent to destroy the elephant and
rhino species in whole or in part.2 07 Though different courts
recognize that "it is not necessary to intend to achieve the complete
annihilation of a group from every corner of the globe," it is enough
to intend the death of a significant portion of the group. 2 08 Moreover,
"a single perpetrator killing a single individual with a genocidal
intent" will satisfy.20 9
In Yugoslavia, a special tribunal led the prosecution of
206. BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (9TH ed. 2009).
207. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 512.
208. Id. at 513.
209. Id. at 511.
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Prosecutor v Jelisic in a case for genocide. 2 1 0 Jelisic held a position
of authority at Luka Camp in Brako, a municipality in northeastern
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2 11 There, he dubbed himself the Serb Adolf
and killed Muslims at will. Though he was ultimately acquitted on
procedural grounds, the Court agreed that all the elements for
genocide were present.2 1 2 Focusing specifically on Jelisic's mens rea,
the court inferred from his "announcements of his quota of daily
killings" and the urge to "execute twenty to thirty persons before
being able to drink his coffee each morning" as sufficient evidence
of intent.2 13
The present genocide against elephant and rhinos in Mozambique
and Tanzania is no different. Similar to Jelisic, while gathering direct
evidence of specific intent from poachers in the ivory trade is not
always possible, "[it] can be inferred from such factors as 'the scale
of atrocities committed' and 'the systematic targeting of victims on
account of their membership of a particular group."' 2 14 Moreover, as
long as "the conduct for which the suspect is allegedly responsible ...
[took] place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct
directed against the targeted group," there is proof of intent.2 1 5
Accordingly, poachers of the black market ivory trade can be
culpable due to objective proof of the patterns of killing and systemic
targeting of elephants and rhinos.
3. Genocidal Conduct
The last element requires the existence of one of the five listed
actions under Article 6 of the Rome Statute. This is easily satisfied
with respect to the poaching at issue because, depending on the
individual circumstances, most cases will involve either "killing
members of the group," "causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group," or "deliberately inflicting on the group
210. Id. at 512.
211. Id. at 516.
212. Id. at 517.
213. Id. at 517, 519; Case Information Sheet, International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/cis/en/cis-jelisic.pdf (last visited
Feb. 18, 2015).
214. Diane F. Orentlicher, Genocide, Crimes of War, http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-
guide/genocide/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
215. VAN SCHAACK, supra note 1, at 531.
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conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part." 2 16 As shown in the first section, most poaching
incidents involve either the serious maiming or death of the animal in
order to extract ivory. Moreover, there is a deliberate targeting of
elephants and rhinos because they are the only species that can grow
ivory tusks.
Despite numerous precedent and historical practices regarding
the broader application of genocide, it still remains a mere proposal
to combat the black market ivory trade. I only hope, through the
showing of both procedural and substantive elements, that it may
prove to be a viable and innovative remedy to curb the extermination
of a species in light of the current rise in poaching.
Conclusion
The current state of the elephant and rhino populations in
Mozambique and Tanzania begs for innovative measures to curb the
black market ivory trade. The suggestion presented is merely one
method to provide for international charges through the application
of genocide. Ultimately, actively fighting this deadly trade through
the criminal prosecution of poachers not only promotes justice but
also ensures the survival of Mozambique and Tanzania as
independent states. In the end, saving their elephant and rhino
populations (the "keystone to the tourism industry ... and the largest
source of foreign exchange") not only spares animal lives, but
ensures the survival of their economies as well. We should not wait
until it is too late to act.
216. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 177.
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